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4I. Introduction
Over one billion people1 view information on the internet
through over eighty five million domain names world wide.2 Last
year, in response to the growth of the internet, the World
Summit on Information Society (“WSIS”)3 affirmed the principle
that, “the international management of the Internet should be .
1 Internet World Stats, Internet Usage Statistics—The Big
Picture, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last
visited July 21, 2006).
2 Verisign, The Verisign Domain Name Report, The Domain Name
Industry Brief, Nov. 2005, at 2, available at http://www.
verisign.com/static/036316.pdf [hereinafter Verisign Report].
3 See World Summit on Information Society, Basic Information:
About World Summit on Information Society, http://www.itu.
int/wsis/basic/about.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2006) (providing
information about the organization, its mandate, and the two
conferences on information society held in Tunisia and Geneva);
see also Internet Governance Forum, Message from the United
Nations Secretary-General, http://www.intgovforum.org/sg-
letter-en.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2006) (stating that the
inaugural conference of the IGF in Athens will discuss broad
issues relating to the openness, security, diversity, and access
of the internet).
5. . with the full involvement of governments, the private
sector, civil society and international organizations."4 But
while the WSIS called for the increased participation of
international organizations, it stated that sovereign states
have the right5 to regulate internet public policy issues that
affect their citizens.6
4 World Summit on Information Society [WSIS], Tunis Agenda for
the Information Society, ¶ 29, WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6 (rev. 1)
(Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Tunis Agenda]. See Kenneth Neil
Cukier, Who Will Control the Internet?, Foreign Affairs,
Nov/Dec. 2005, at 7 (reporting that many governments feel that a
“multinational treaty” should regulate the internet and that
China called for the creation of a new “international treaty
organization”).
5 See Kim G. Von Arx & Gregory R. Hagen, Sovereign Domain Names A
Declaration of Independence of ccTLDs from Foreign Control, 9
Rich. J.L. & Tech. 4, ¶ 21 (2002) (noting how nations
recognize their country code top level domain (“ccTLD”)as a
part of their national sovereignty); see also
Walter C. Dauterman, Jr., Comment, Internet Regulations:
Foreign Actors and Local Harms—At the Crossroads of Pornography,
Hate Speech, and Freedom of Expression, 28 N.C.J. Int’l L. &
Com. Reg. 177, 184-88 (2002) (discussing the jurisdictional
6The conflict between the call for increased international
cooperation and the sovereign rights of states to regulate the
internet brings to the forefront a key legal issue not addressed
at the WSIS summit: the extent to which governments7 should
issues that relate to nations wanting to control the internet
within “clearly marked” borders).
6 Tunis Agenda, supra note 4, ¶ 35a. See ICANN Oversight and
Security of Internet Root Servers and the Domain Name System
(DNS): Subcommittee on Communications Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation United States Senate, 108th Cong.
(2004) (testimony of John Kneuer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information, United States Department of
Commerce) (testifying that governments and civil society
organizations effectively represent the interests of private
individuals as they relate to the internet).
7 See Government Advisory Committee, The Internet Domain Name
System and the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) of the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
http://gac.icann.org/web/about/gac-outreach-english.htm (last
visited Aug. 7, 2006) (explaining that nations should offer
their input through the GAC because of the divergent national
laws related to domain names); see also discussion, infra Part
II.C (examining the current tension between national
7control freedom of speech8 within the existing domain name
system.9
The internet can transmit an individual’s thoughts and
ideas10 instantly around the world unlike previous information
governments and the private organization that currently manages
the domain name system).
8 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., The First Amendment in Cross-
Cultural Perspective A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Freedom
of Speech 214 (2006) (arguing that free speech is “highly
culturally contingent” and thus an individual should not depend
only on “universalistic” claims about the right); see also
Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Protecting the Human Right to
Freedom of Expression on the Global Internet, http:www.gilc.org/
speech/report/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) [hereinafter gilc]
(maintaining that the internet allows individuals to circumvent
governmental controls through changing the name of a banned
website or “dialing into” a new server).
9 See Interview with ICANN President and CEO Paul Twomey China
Business News On-Line, Interfax News Agency, Mar. 17, 2006
[hereinafter Twomey Interview] (emphasizing that ICANN wants
governments to distinguish between domain names policies and the
content found on websites).
8technologies.11 Domain names are the unique location identifiers
of every web page, and thus, are an inherent part of the
internet.12 The United States established the present domain
10 See Dawn Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms,
and Internet Governance, 52 Emory L.J. 187, 194 (2002)
(insisting that the internet is a “valuable forum” for the
expression of ideas and thoughts across the globe); see also
Twomey Interview, supra note 9 (stating that content “drives”
the internet, and that the utility of the internet for most
individuals is the ability to access information).
11See gilc, supra note 8 (explaining that the internet is a
unique communications medium because the Internet is:(1)
global, provides immediate access to information from around the
world; (2) decentralized, works without “gatekeepers”; (3) open,
provides an inexpensive medium to publish content; (4) abundant,
unlimited amounts of capacity to store information); see also
Joanne Holman & Michael A. Mcgregor, The Internet as Commons:
The Issue at Access, 10 Comm. L. & Pol'y 267, 282-86 (2005)
(articulating that the internet is different from other forms of
communication because it allows users to interact and
communicate with others, and also enables the production of a
“vast range of content”).
9name system by partially ceding control13 over to a private non-
profit corporation based in the United States known as the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”).14
12 See Peter B. Maggs, American Law in a Time of Global
Interdependence: U.S. National Reports To the XVITH
International Congress of Comparative Law: Section III The
“.us” Internet Domain, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 297, 298 (2002)
(explaining that every domain name includes a top level domain
(“tld”) and a local domain). In weather.com, .com is the tld and
weather is the “second level domain”. Id. See also Peter K. Yu,
The Origins of CCTLD Policymaking, 12 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp.
L. 387, 392 (2004) (detailing how domain names are a “practical
necessity” because they are easier to remember than “numeric
addresses” and are needed for identification of general
websites); Craig McTaggart, Symposium/Article, The ENUM
Protocol, Telecommunications Numbering, and Internet Governance,
12 Cardozo J. Intl & Comp. L. 507, 525 (2004) (stating that the
domain name system is “hierarchical” in order to maintain the
feasibility of a global internet network).
13 See Memorandum of Understanding Between The U.S. Department of
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, http:// www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm
(last visited Aug. 7, 2006) [hereinafter MOU] (describing how
10
Tensions exist between ICANN and national governments over
the extent to which the domain name system should facilitate
the United States government was to cede control of the domain
name system to ICANN and the principles that the government
wanted the private organization to maintain).
14 See Victor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance:
Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation, 43 Va. J. Int’l L.
605, 660-62 (2003) (arguing that the motivation of Congress to
create a private organization and not an international body
derived from the need for “flexible and timely solution” to the
growth of the internet). Further, an international agreement
would have taken too “long to finalize”. Id. See also Michael
Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around
the APA and the Constitution, 50 Duke L.J. 17, 20 (2000)
(explaining that ICANN is a private non profit California
Corporation with a memorandum of understanding with the United
States Department of Commerce to regulate the allocation of
domain names world wide); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Fast, Cheap,
And Out of Control: Lessons From the ICANN Dispute Resolution
Process, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 191, 196 (2002)
(detailing how ICANN was put in charge of adopting a dispute
resolution policy that would ensure the timely adjudication of
domain name disputes).
11
certain forms of speech.15 In order to ensure that domain names
continue to provide the global internet community access to
15 See Kieren McCarthy, Newly Asked Questions: Why Can’t I Find
.xxx On the Net, The Guardian, May 18, 2006, at 2 (reporting
that although ICANN initially supported the creation of a .xxx
domain name, an area for pornographic and obscene material, the
organization likely voted against the measure because of
pressure from the United States government with the support of
conservative Christian groups); see also Rana Foroohar, et. al.,
The Internet Splits Up; The Web Changed the World. Politics is
not Changing it Back, Newsweek International, May 15, 2006
(emphasizing that many nations protested ICANN’s proposal to
create a .xxx domain name because they viewed pornography
as offensive); Burt Helm, Domain Wars Rage On, Business Week
Online, May 23, 2006 (elaborating that ICM registry is
commencing a law suit in U.S. District Court in order to obtain
communications that will “shed light” on why ICANN voted against
the .xxx); Michael Geist, Domain Names Shouldn’t Be Only a U.S.
Domain, Toronto Star, May 22, 2006 at C03 (explaining that the
free speech community has expressed disappointment in ICANN’s
policies to resolve domain name disputes, because the policy
“has been used to shut down websites presenting legitimate
criticism”).
12
information and content,16 the development of international law17
within the domain name system may be necessary.18 But the
16 See United States Strives to Maintain Internet Dynamism,
States New Service, Oct. 6, 2005 (noting that the United States
delegation at the WSIS summit did not look favorably upon the
nations that supported certain policy proposals because of
their records in restricting content on the internet); see also
Rolf H. Weber, Regulatory Models for the Online World 187
(2002) (articulating that freedom of expression includes the
right to communicate and "disseminate" information and to
receive information of a "public nature").
17 Compare, Ira Magaziner, The Role Governments Should Play in
Internet Policy, in Protecting Our Children On the Internet, 87,
88 (Jens Waltermann & Marcel Machill eds., 2000) (arguing that
the state should intervene in the maintenance of the internet in
order to protect the rights “of its citizens” from treats
against the “common good”), with Adam Newey, Freedom of
Expression: Censorship in Private Hands, in Liberating
Cyberspace Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and the Internet, 38,
39 (Pluto Press & Liberty: The National Council for Civil
Liberties eds., 1999) (hypothesizing that freedom of expression
may flourish if both private actors and national governments did
not regulate the internet).
13
ability of international law to substantively define the
protection of freedom of speech in relation to domain names is
at a critical point in history because of the increasing
influence of national laws.19
The vacuous response to freedom of speech concerns within
the current system encouraged national governments to exert more
control over domain names. First, the United States did not
consider the implications for free speech when it ceded control
over to ICANN.20 At the same time, ICANN’s mandate specified
18 But see Kim G. von Arx, ICANN—Now and Then ICANN’s Reforms and
Its Problems, 2003 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 7, ¶ 27 (2003) (stating
that the United States Government views the “internalization” of
ICANN as a poor option for the domain name system, and thus will
unlikely relinquish control of the A root server); Monroe E.
Price & Stefaan G. Verhulst, Self Regulation and the Internet, 9
(2005) (arguing that self-regulation is beneficial because it
avoids "state intervention" in areas of freedom of speech, and
offers standards for "social responsibility").
19 See discussion, infra Part III.B (detailing how national
governments are increasing their influence over the domain
name system).
20 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Management of Internet Names and
Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,742 (June 10, 1998) available
14
that the organization should represent the internet community,21
without the involvement of national governments and
international organizations.22 Second, no international
convention or organization directly addressed free speech
concerns as they relate to domain names.23 With no set of legal
at http://www.icann.org/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm.
[hereinafter White Paper] (stating that the private corporation
in charge of the domain name system would not need to adjudicate
free speech disputes, because the modified domain name system
would not disturb free speech protections).
21 See J. Postel, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation,
http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1591.txt (last visited Aug. 7,
2006) [hereinafter Postel] (articulating that Domain Name
managers would offer their services to the international
internet community).
22 See MOU, supra note 13 (noting the importance of private
actors in the stability, competition, coordination, and
representation of the domain name system); see also Arx
& Hagen, supra note 5 (citing to the White Paper which stated
that the United States delegated power to ICANN in order to
increase the “voice” of the “global internet user”).
23 See Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent 66 (1999)(explaining that
15
standards it was only a matter of time before nations stepped in
to influence domain name policy.
National governments are also exerting greater control over
domain names through advisory committees,24 established by ICANN,
and through the significant growth25 of country code top level
the extent to which the world needed to tolerate hate speech
created by the Nazis and other fascist groups motivated the
language contained in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights); see also The United Nations International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(A) (XXI),
art. 19 § 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (March 21, 1976) [hereinafter UN
Covenant] (stating nothing about the internet as a “frontier”
where “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression”).
24 See Wolfgang Kleinwaechter, ICANN Governance: From Self-
Governance To Public-Private Partnership: The Changing Role of
Governments in the Management of the Internet’s Core Resources,
36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1103, 1123-24 (2003) (elaborating on how
ICANN reforms, known as ICANN 2.0, allowed for the increased
involvement of national governments in policy decisions); see
also discussion, infra Part II.D ( information about
the Government Advisory Council and how the committee works
within the current domain name system governance structure).
25 See Verisign Report, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that ccTLDs
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domains(“ccTLD”).26 ccTLDs are two-letter country codes assigned
to every country in the world.27 Many governments now view the
maintenance of ccTLDs as a part of their sovereign right.28
registrations grew by 25%); see also The European Registry of
Internet Domain Names, Eurid’s Quarterly Progress Report To The
European Commission: First Quarter (2006), available at
http://www.eurid.eu/en/general/news/eurid2019s-first-quarterly-
report-is-now-available [hereinfter EURid] (providing statistics
on the growth of the .eu domain name and specific ccTLDs in
Europe).
26 See generally Addressing the World National Identity and
Internet Country Code Domains (Erica Schlesinger Wass ed., 2003)
(offering essays on the effect ccTLDs have on several nations’
identities).
27 See Arx & Hagen, supra note 5, ¶ 4 (noting that there are 243
nations with a delegated ccTLD)
28 See Kenneth Neil Cukier, Presented at INET 2002: Eminent
Domain: Initial Policy Perspectives on Nationalizing Country
Code Internet Addresses (June 2002), available at
http://www.inet2002.org/CD-ROM/lu65rw2n/papers/g03-b.pdf)
(arguing that nations view the two letter ccTLD as a part of
their sovereignty and “vital national interest").
17
With the increasing involvement of national governments in
domain name governance and the rising registration of ccTLDs, a
critical question remains: how can the current system change to
protect freedom of speech on the internet in relation to domain
names? Because of the increasing power of national governments,
the United States needs to encourage an international convention
that ensures freedom of speech will be protected in the
transparent allocation of domain names on the internet.
Part II of this Comment explores domain name laws in
relation to international freedom of speech protections,29 the
freedom of speech guarantees protected by ICANN,30 and the free
speech considerations in a variety of national ccTLDs policies.31
Part III analyzes the implications for free speech in relation
to domain names with the increasing involvement of national
29 See discussion, infra Part II.A (discussing the protections
granted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
30 See discussion, infra Parts II.B-C (detailing the importance
of free speech within domain names and specifying how ICANN’s
Universal Dispute Resolution Policy addresses free speech
concerns in domain name disputes).
31 See discussion, infra Part II.D (providing background
information about ccTLDs and explaining ccTLD laws from the
European Union, China, and India).
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governments,32 and the possible solutions that the international
community could provide.33 Part IV offers recommendations for
inviting national governments into an international convention
to guarantee free speech considerations in the allocation and
dispute resolution of domain names.34
II. Background
The debate over the extent to which international law can
regulate free speech in the transmission of content is not new.35
32 See discussion, infra Parts III.A-B (analyzing how domain law
affect an individuals free speech and how the increasing role of
national governments threatens free speech in relation to domain
names).
33 See discussion, infra Part III.C (arguing that international
organization would aid in the protection of freedom of speech in
relation to domain names).
34 See discussion, infra Parts IV.A-C (recommending that a
national convention, ICANN, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights recognize free speech in relation to domain names).
35 See Michael J. Farley, Conflicts Over Government Control of
Information—The United States and Unesco, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 1071,
1074-78 (1985) (detailing how the Soviet Bloc nations
attempted to create a New World Information Communication Order
to compensate for the perceived Western Bias “in the gathering
19
The internet presents an opportunity for international law to
regulate domain names36 because the world wide web is not subject
to the traditional forces of governmental control.37 Although the
internet is a unique communications tool, there still exists a
and controlling of news”).
36 See Johnson & Post, Symposium, Surveying Law and Borders: Law
And Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev.
1367, 1370-72 (1996) (arguing that the internet functions
beyond the territorial borders of nations because the cost and
speed of transmission are “almost entirely independent” of
physical locations). But see Dauterman Jr., supra note 5, at
218-19 (contending that the internet exists in real time and
real place, and that international guarantees on freedom of
speech, such as the UDHR give nations a blank check in the
regulation of speech on the internet). Dauterman concludes that
the only real limits on national control of the internet are
found in the “internationally accepted principles of
extraterritorial jurisdiction”. Id.
37 See Holman & Mcgregor, supra note 11, at 288 (explaining that
the characteristics of the Internet allow individuals to believe
that a free exchange of information exists without the
traditional forms of governmental regulation).
20
debate over the extent to which international38 or national law39
should regulate and control this distinct communications
medium.40
38 See generally, Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Symposium, Internet
and Legal Theory the Internet is Changing International Law, 73
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 997, 1037 (2003) (exploring how the internet
can help facilitate the growth of international law because it
allows for the growth of “international norms”). See Dauterman
Jr., supra note 5, at 208 (maintaining that legitimate
regulation of the internet needs to conform to international
guarantees of free speech and expression).
39 See Mayer-Schnonberger, supra note 14, at 613-15 (articulating
that “traditionalists” believe nations should govern the
internet because of a state’s “democratic legitimization” and
the ability of the nation-state to enforce regulations on a
large scale).
40 See Johnson & Post, supra note 36, at 1374 (stating that any
regulatory measures in cyberspace are likely to fail because
users on the internet can simply move to the next logical open
portal ie they can exit those areas of the internet under
control). But see Dawn Nunziato, Book Review: Exit Voice, and
Values on the Net, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 753, 766-68 (2002)
(contending that a cyber market premised upon the ability of an
21
A similar debate occurs in regards to freedom of speech.
Local cultural values largely determine the level of speech
protected in different societies across the globe.41 On one side
of the spectrum is the United States, dedicated to protecting
the freedom of speech42, and on the opposite end, nations that
curtail and censor almost all forms of expression.43
internet user to exit may not allow the protection of “unpopular
or minority speech”).
41 See Weber, supra note 16, at 190 (listing political,
historical, religious, and social consideration as variables
that determine what a society views as protected speech); see
also Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 8, at 214 (explaining that
free speech is “highly culturally contingent” and that an
individual should not depend only on "universalistic" claims
about the right).
42 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (discussing how the
Communications Decency act violated the first amendment because
the CDA completely silenced protected speech). Compare
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (expressing the
idea that the state can limit free speech only if an individual
is advocating the incitement of “imminent lawless action”), with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964)
(holding that a public official cannot recover from defamation
22
These seemingly polar views of free speech protection
attempt to coexist within international guarantees of human
rights.44 In the past, nations agreed to limit speech that
advocated hate and discrimination, and thus, there are some
unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual
malice”).
43 See Colby C. Nuttall, Defining International Satellite
Communications As Weapons of Mass Destruction: The First Step in
A Compromise Between National Sovereignty and the Free Flow of
Ideas, 27 Hous. J. Intl’ L. 389, 400 (2005) (noting that nations
which limit the free flow of information cite to article II of
the U.N. charter which grants deference to a nation’s “cultural,
religious, social, and economic interest”); see also Mark
Konkel, Internet Indecency, International Censorship, Service
Providers’ Liability 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 453, 465
(2000) (emphasizing that levels of free speech protection depend
largely upon the extent to which a nation has the jurisdiction
to adjudicate a claim).
44 See Dauterman, supra note 5, at 212 (arguing that the UDHR
and the Discrimination Convention are weak because they fail to
define the standards by which nations should guarantee
particular rights).
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areas of consensus.45 The tension between national norms of free
speech and international guarantees of human rights largely
frames the debate in relation to domain names.
A. Free Speech and International Law: The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
The international community often cites to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) Article 19 as a guarantee
for freedom of speech.46 Article 19 of the UDHR states that
“everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression . .
45 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A
(III) art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
UDHR Resolution] (“All are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination.”); see also Morsink, supra
note 23, at 72 (maintaining that the drafters of the UDHR
believed that an individual should be protected from both
blatant forms of discrimination and the “incitement” of
discrimination).
46 See Morsink, supra note 23, at 65-69 (describing the debate
between nations over article 19, in which the Soviet Union
worried that freedom of expression would enable fascist to
express their ideas, and Western governments viewed the article
as necessary in order to protect freedom of expression).
24
.regardless of frontiers.”47 Although it is not a treaty,
scholars consider the UDHR as a part of customary international
law.48 But there are exceptions within the UDHR that limit the
legal obligations of member states. Article 29(2) states that
nations can limit the applicability of the UDHR in order to meet
the “requirements of morality, public order, and the general
welfare in a democratic society.”49
B. Free Speech and Domain Names
A large part of the internet is transmission of content.50
Domain name registrations of both gTLDs and ccTLDs are
47 UDHR Resolution, supra note 45, art. 19.
48 See Konkel, supra note 43, at 472 (maintaining that the UDHR
has become a “normative instrument” for member states because
many nations incorporated the “principles” of the UDHR into
their own laws).
49 See UDHR Resolution, supra note 45, art. 29 § 2 (“In the
exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others . . .”).
50 See Interfax News Agency, supra note 9 (that the director of
ICANN believed that the real thing that “drives” the internet is
content).
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increasingly dramatically around the world,51 and thus domain
names52 play an important role in the transmission of an
individual’s ideas.53 Although the Domain Name system may not
51 See Verisign Report, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the 85.6
million domain names world wide at the end of third quarter 2005
was a “record setting number” that reflects a “29 percent
increase year over year”); see also EURid, supra note 25, at 4
(emphasizing that in just one week the .eu domain name
registered 1.5 million new websites); China Internet Network
Information Center, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/index/0O/
index.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) [hereinafter CNNIC]
(providing up to date statistics on the number of domain names
registered in China).
52 See Internet Domain Names: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Communications of the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 107th Cong.(2001) (statement of Michale M. Roberts,
President and CEO, ICANN) (testifying how the DNS allows
internet users to type the name of internet addresses, instead
of the unique numbers assigned to each computer, in order to
find an internet website).
53 See Chinese Domain Name Consortium, The Proposal for
Internationalizing ccTLD names, June 2005, at 2, available at
http://www.icann.org/announcements/idn-tld-cdnc.pdf (stating
26
affect national policies already censoring the internet,54 the
control over how a domain name is registered and disputes are
adjudicated ultimately implicate a website’s content.55 For a
website to display information it must initially register a
that a domain name is the “most important way” to locate
resources on the internet). But see Yu, supra note 12, at 406
(arguing that ICANN and the DNS represent a tiny portion of the
internet governance issue because most commentators focus on
child pornography, spam, and the intellectual property rights
associated with the internet).
54 See Elaine Chen, Global Internet Freedom: Can Censorship
And Freedom Coexist?, 13 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol’y
229, 245 (2003) (listing nations such as Cuba, Laos,
Burma, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Vietnam, Yemen, and China
which “severely” hamper their citizens’ ability to access the
internet); see also Phillip J. Oliveri, Technological Software
That Counters Internet Jamming: Its Role in the U.S. and In Non-
Democratic Countries, 2003 Syracuse Law & Tech J. 5, 6 (2003)
(explaining that nations can censor what an individual
views on the internet when either the government owns and
operates the actual internet service providers, or when the
government uses proxy servers to block information from being
accessed by an individual).
55 Nunziato, supra note 10, at 193.
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domain name.56 And if the domain name is cancelled the content
is ultimately lost.57
C. ICANN: The Private Organization that Maintains the
Domain Name System.
The creation of ICANN, a private corporation in California,
came from the realization of the United States government58 that
56 See MOU supra note 13 (maintaining that the United States
government wanted ICANN to develop a “domain name registration
service” that would ensure the stability of the internet); see
also, Internet Corporation for Assigned Name and Numbers,
Accreditation Overview, http://www.icann.org/registrars/
accreditation-overview.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2006) (noting
that the shared registration system is a system in which ICANN
forms a contract with a accredited organization to register
different domain names); Froomkin, supra note 14, at
41 (emphasizing the registrants and managers, not specific “IP
numbers,” make every domain name unique on the internet).
57 Nunziato, supra note 10, at 193.
58 See A proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet
Names and Addresses Discussion Draft, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826 (Feb.
20, 1998) [hereinafter Green Paper] (stating that the
corporation in charge of domain names should be headquartered
within the United States and subject to American regulations and
28
domain name management needed to have a private partnership in
order for the internet to grow.59 The United States wanted ICANN
to control the domain name system with little participation from
national governments, in order to fully represent internet
users.60
But two problems developed with the establishment of ICANN:
1) no policy stipulating how ICANN would ensure the protection
laws); see also James Glavem, Net Mourns Passing of Giant Wired
News, Oct. 18, 1998, http://www.wired.com/news/Culture/0,1284,
15682,00.html (detailing how the “father of the internet” David
Postel was the architect of the modern domain name system).
59 See Kleinwaechter, supra note 24, at 1108 (explaining that
Postel believed in limiting the role of government in the
management of the domain name system); see also Nunziato, supra
note 10, at 231 (detailing why the United States could not rely
upon the carefully-designed, preexisting structures of
representative government because the internet transcended the
boundaries of territorial sovereigns).
60 See Green Paper, supra note 58 (stating that in the view of
the United States the private partnership would secure four
basic objectives of the DNS stability, competition, private
bottom-up coordination, and representation).
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of an individual’s speech in relation to domain names;61 2)
national governments questioning the legitimacy of a private
organization in the United States controlling the registration
and adjudication of all domain names,62 including generic top
61 See Nunziato, supra note 10, at 193 (arguing that ICANN’s
policies affect free speech because they reduce the anonymity of
the register, and the UDRP procedures allow for the “surrender”
of domain names that are critical of trademark owners).
62 See Internet Management: Limited Progress on Privatization
Project Makes Outcome Uncertain: Testimony Before the Subcomm.
On Sci., Tech., and Space of the Senate Comm. On Commerce, Sci.,
and Transp., 107th Cong. 15 (2002) (testimony of Peter Guerrero,
Director, Physical Infrastructures Issues, United States General
Accounting Office) [hereinafter Guerrero testimony] (testyfying
that because ICANN is a private organization attempting to
develop domain names from the bottom up within the global
internet community ICANN’s “legitimacy and effectiveness” remain
in “question). But see White Paper, supra note 20 (articulating
that the U.S. government may have considered the concerns of
national governments when it stated that, “management structures
should reflect the functional and geographic diversity of the
internet and its users”).
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level domains(“gTLD”).63 ICANN maintains gTLD domain names, such
as .com, .net, and .org. by contracting with other private
organizations.64 In the past year, nearly 46% of all registered
domain names were with the gTLD “.com” domain name.65 Because the
control ICANN has over domain names, some nations proposed
regulating authority from ICANN to an international
organization.66
1. The Universal Dispute Resolution Policy
In order to adjudicate disputes between internet users
around the globe ICANN established the Uniform Domain Name
63 See Arx, supra note 18, ¶ 11 (listing .com, .net, .mil, .gov
as domain names of the gTLD).
64 See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F.Supp 2d 745, 747 (E.D.
Va. 2001) (noting that although ICANN maintains the domain name
system, every accredited register works with ICANN through
renewable contracts and not direct regulation).
65 See Verisign Report, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that in 2005
the .com domain name registration grew by 29% over the previous
year).
66 See Kleinwaechter, supra note 24, at 1111 (explaining how the
initial U.S. proposal for the domain name system caused a wave
of criticism, particularly from the E.U. which called for an
“international representative body for future Internet
Governance.”).
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Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”)67. The UDRP attempts to
resolve private domain name disputes mainly in regards to
trademark law.68 ICANN lists four official agencies—located
around the world—that are responsible for adjudicating domain
name disputes according to the UNDRP.69
67 See generally Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, infra note
70, ¶ 1 (emphasizing that the purpose of the UDRP is to settle
disputes involving the “registration” and “use” of a domain
name). See Stacey H. King, Trademarks, Domain Names, and the
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, in Trademark Law & the
Internet Issues, Case Law and Practice Tips 275, 276 (Lisa E.
Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield eds., 2nd ed. 2001) (reiterating
that the UDRP is binding on all domain name registrants that use
an accredited ICANN register, and that some ccTLD have adopted
the UDRP on a voluntary basis).
68 See Lisa M. Sharrock, The Future of Domain Name Dispute
Resolution: Crafting Practical International Legal Solutions
From Within the UDRP Framework, 51 Duke L.J. 817, 821
(2001) (stating that domain names disputes include “pure
speculation”—registration of un-trade-marked words in order to
sell for a profit, and cybersquatting—registering a domain name
with protected trademarks in order to demand a “ransom”).
69 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Name And Numbers,
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Approved Providers, http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-
providers.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2005) (listing the
approved providers that use the UDRP in domain name disputes);
see also Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre,
http://www.adndrc.org/adndrc/index.htm (last visited Aug. 7,
2006) (detailing the history and the cases handled by the
center); International Institute for Conflict Prevention &
Resolution, http://www.cpradr.org/ICANN_Menu.asp?M=1.6.6 (last
visited Aug. 7, 2006) (explaining how the institute incorporates
the UDRP into its adjudication procedures of domain name
disputes); National Arbitration Forum, http://domains.
adrforum.com (last visted Aug. 7, 2006) (articulating how
the forum adjudicates domain names disputes); Sue Ann Mota,
Internet Domain Name Disputes Working Towards a Global
Solution, 7 Comp. L. Rev. & Tech. J. 213, 217-18 (2004)
(providing general background information on the number of cases
that the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Center,
International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution,
and the National Arbitration Forum have adjudicated).
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2. National Sovereignty Concerns Associated with the
UDRP
Although, the UDRP policy allows parties to appeal a
panel’s decision to appropriate national courts,70 ICANN’s
adjudication policies in regard to domain names aroused national
sovereignty concerns.71 In the United States the fourth circuit
noted that individuals registering their domain name with ICANN
are provided “full blown” recourse to national courts “in order
to prevent abuse of the UDRP process.”72
70 See Internet Corporation for Assigned Name and Numbers,
Universal Dispute Resolution Policy, Oct. 24, 1999, § 4(k),
available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm
[hereinafter UDRP] (stating that an individual is free to file a
claim in a national court, even before the approved UDRP panel
adjudicates the dispute).
71 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, National Trademark Laws and the Non
National Domain Name System, 21 U. Pa J. Int’l Econ. L. 495, 511
(2000) (emphasizing that although there is a core principle
of free speech protection, nations deal with levels of
protection in different ways).
72 Barcelona.com v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330
F.3d 617, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2003). See Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act § 1125(d), 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(2006)
(stating that an individual will be liable in a civil action by
34
3. UDRP Free Speech Cases
UDRP panels have decided whether or not a domain name
furthers an individual’s right to freedom of speech.73 Within
the UDRP, some expert panels have held that a register’s free
speech interest does not extend to the right to use another
domain name.74 The implication of individuals’ free speech
the owner of the “mark” if that person has a “bad faith”
interest in the mark); see also Lanham Act § 1125(a), 15
U.S.C.S. § 1114 (2006) (prohibiting the use of a trademark that
is likely to cause confusion about the source of the product or
service).
73 See Robert A. Badgley, Internet Domain Names and ICANN
Arbitration: The Emerging “Law” of Domain Name Custody
Disputes, 5 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 343, 361 (2001) (citing to
CompUSA Mgmt. Co. v. Kahn, Case No. 123921 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct.
18, 2002) (noting that the respondent’s negative
characterization of complaintant’s goods was legitimate as
any other “commercial activity” because the first amendment
protects a person’s right to criticize)).
74 See Victoria Holstein-Childress, Lex Cyberus: The UDRP as a
Gatekeeper to Judicial Resolution of Competing Rights to Domain
Names 109 Penn St. L. Rev 565, 570-91 (2004) (providing details
of WIPO panels that have dealt with free speech claims); see
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rights are mostly adjudicated in cases involving gripe sites or
suck cites, such as walmartsucks.com.75 The following two cases
are examples of how World Intellectual Property (“WIPO”) panels76
ruled on free speech considerations.
i. Estee Lauder v. Hanna
also Dr. Milton Mueller, Success by Default: A New Profile of
Domain Name Trademark Disputes Under ICANN’s UDRP, Syracuse
University School of Information Studies, June 24, 2002, at 22-7
(explaining that many plaintiffs in domain name dispute
arbitrations are not shy about using domain name challenges to
simply silent critics). Overall the study found that in Critic
and Commentary cases respondents won in UDRP panels only 36% of
the time. Id.
75 See Badgley, supra note 73, at 360 (arguing that individuals
register “grip cites” for the purpose of criticizing another
business or entity).
76 See World Intellectual Property Organization, http://arbiter.
wipo.int/domains/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (providing general
information about WIPO and the cases adjudicated by the
organization); see also Mota, supra note 69, at 217 (detailing
how the World Intellectual Property Organization ruled on
certain domain name cases).
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In Estee Lauder v. Hanna the respondent claimed a protected
free speech right to create a domain name similar to the Estee
Lauder website.77 The panel evaluated UDRP section 4(a)(ii)—
whether the respondent had any rights or legitimate interest in
respect to the domain name.78 The panel acknowledged that under
U.S. law, the respondent had an “extensive free speech right to
provide a platform to criticize the mark owner.”79 But the panel
found that the respondent’s first amendment rights in the United
States did not outweigh the trademark interests embodied in the
UNDRP’s standard.80
ii. Bridgestone Firestone v. Myers
In Bridgestone Firestone v. Myers the complaintants alleged
that the respondent’s domain name was similar to their own.81 The
77 Estee Lauder Inc. v. Estelauder.com, Case No. D2000.0869,
(WIPO Sept. 25, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int
/Domains/ decisions/html/2000/d2000-0869.html [hereinafter Estee
Lauder].
78 UDRP, supra note 70, § 4(a)(ii).
79 Estee Lauder, supra note 77.
80 Id.
81 Bridgestone Firestone v. Jack Myers, Case No. D2000-0190 (WIPO
July 7, 2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains
/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html [hereinafter Bridgestone]. 
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respondent argued that he had a free speech right to maintain
the domain name.82 The panel noted that its jurisdiction was
limited to the rules of the UDRP.83 But since both parties were
from the U.S, the panel decided to reference to U.S. case law.84
Although free speech is not listed as a legitimate
noncommercial fair use of a domain name under section 4(c)(iii)
of the UDRP, the panel argued that the list was not
“exclusive”.85 The panel concluded that the exercise of free
speech through criticism and commentary demonstrated, “a right
or legitimate interest in the domain name . . . the right to
free speech should be one of the foundations of Internet law.”86
82 Id.
83 UDRP supra note 70, § 4(a).
84 See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F.Supp.2d
1161, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that the defendants use of
a trademark on an internet cite was commentary and did not
impinge or dilute the plaintiffs mark); see also Name.Space,
Inc. v. Network Solutions Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir. 2000)
(concluding that “domain names” are not automatically protected
by the first amendment because courts must first analyze the use
of the domain name).
85 Bridgestone, supra note 81.
86 Id.
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D. Country Code Top Level Domains
In the mid 1980s, nations were issued ccTLDs based upon ISO
3166-1 country codes.87 Although ICANN officially controls every
ccTLD, as the internet developed, national governments viewed
ccTLDs as components of their national sovereignty, furthering
political and economic goals.88 National governments offer a
87 See J. Postel, supra note 21 (arguing that individual
managers, and not governments, should act as a “trustee” for the
ccTLD for both the citizens of the nation and the “global
internet community”); see also Kleinwaechter, supra note 24, at
1106 (emphasizing that many world governments initially ignored
Postel's delegation of ccTLDs because few governments considered
the DNS “worthy of attention").
88 See Arx & Hagen, supra note 6, ¶ 21 (explaining that because
certain ccTLDs require a "domestic presence" for an individual
to register a domain name, there is an inherent “association” or
relationship between the country and the registrant); see also
Yu, supra note 12, at 388-90 (articulating that although nations
were initially uninterested in ccTLD, as the internet developed
national governments realized the social and economic importance
of domain name system); Xue Hong, Domain Name Dispute Resolution
in China: A Comprehensive Review, 18 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J.
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significant amount of input into ccTLD policy through the
Government Advisory Committee(“GAC”).89 The GAC provides advice
to ICANN in respect to the implications of the private
organization’s decisions on national laws.90 The influence of
1, 3-4 (2004) (detailing how the China Network and Information
Center (“CNNIC”) is under the control of the Ministry of
Information Industry (“MII”)).
89 See generally Internet Corporation for Assigned Name and
Numbers, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, art. XI § 2, http://www.icann.org/general/
bylaws.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (illustrating how
the GAC can appoint annually one non-voting “liaison” to the
ICANN Board of Directors and the ICANN Nominating Committee).
90 Compare Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
Principles and Guidelines for the Delegation and Administration
of Country Code Top Level Domains, ¶ 1.2, http://gac.icann.
org/web/home/ccTLD_Principles.rtf (last visited Aug. 7, 2006)
(stating that ccTLD issues should be dealt with by local
“internet communities” because of the local impact of many ccTLD
policies), with Peter K. Yu, The Never Ending ccTLD Story, in
National Identity and Internet Country Code Domains, supra note
26, at 7 (arguing a “confederation” of local ccTLD
administrators could come together and recognize ICANN). Yu also
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the GAC increased as a result of ICANN’s concern over its
relationship with private organizations that maintain ccTLDs in
their respective countries.91 Many of the local organizations
deny ICANN’s authority over domain names.92 The following are
examples of national and super-national ccTLD laws.
notes that if ccTLD managers continue to not recognize the
authority of ICANN, then the power of the organization will
eventually weaken. Id., at 8.
91 See Committee on ICANN Revolution and Reform, Recommendations
for the Revolution and Reform of ICANN, May 2002, at IX,
available at http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/
recommendations-31may02.htm (suggesting that in order to reach a
balance between allowing national governments to express their
concerns to ICANN and representing the interests of individual
internet users across the globe the "GAC Secretariat" and
ICANN's staff should have "regular interaction"); see also
Taggart, supra note 12, at 538 (evaluating Lynn's presidential
report and concluding that Lynn realized that a purely private
organization could not handle both the technical and policy
aspects of "DNS management").
92 Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward Criticle
Theory of Cyberspace, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 749, 849 (2003). See
Sharrock, supra note 68, at 839 (specifying that the UDRP does
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1. European Union and “.eu”
The domain name “.eu” has been in existence since December
2005.93 Only companies with their principle place of business
within the community and citizens of the Union can register with
the “.eu” ccTLD.94 The European Union also implemented a domain
name dispute resolution policy that incorporated several public
policy concerns and the recommendations of WIPO.95 Questions of
not apply to ccTLDS, if the nation has not officially “adopted”
the UDRP); see also Arx & Hagen, supra note 5, ¶ 34 (explaining
that "most countries" have not signed agreements with ICANN
because of differences over payments, "equality” in decision-
making, and “representation” with the ICANN structure); Maggs,
supra note 12, at 604 (questioning why ICANN policies do not
distinguish between closed and open ccTLDs).
93EURid, supra note 25, at 4.
94See Commission Regulation 733/2002 art. 4 section 2(b)(i)-
(iii), 2002 O.J. (L 113) 1 [hereinafter .eu regulation] (stating
that in order to register a domain name with the “.eu” ccTLD a
business must have its “central administration or principal
place of business” within the community; an organization needs
to be “established” within the community; and a “natural
resident” of the European Union).
95 Id., arts. 4-5.
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legitimate free speech concerns in the adjudication in domain
name disputes are left to national and European Union laws.96
2. China and “.cn”
Registrations of the “.cn” domain name are rapidly
growing.97 The Ministry of Information Industry must approve all
domain name registrations.98 Non Chinese “entities”99 may register
websites under the “.cn” domain name.100 Any domain name
96 See id., art. 21 § 2(c) (detailing that a holder of a
domain name can make a legitimate and non-commercial use of a
domain name as long as the holder does not have the intent to
mislead consumers).
97 See China Internet Network Information Center, Domain
Name Statistics, http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/index/0O/index.htm
(last visited August 1, 2008) (providing monthly domain name
registration statistics which depict an increase of the .cn
domain name).
98 China Internet Domain Name Regulations Order No. 30,
Ministry of Information Industry of the People’s Republic of
China, art. 8 (2004) [hereinafter known as China Internet Domain
Name]
99 See Hong, supra note 88, at 7 (specifying that an individual
cannot register a domain name under .cn).
100 See id., at 6 (stating applicants registering with the .cn
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registered, including “.cn,” cannot have content that harms the
“national honor,” violates state religion policies, or
instigates crime.101
3. India and “.in”
The “.in” registry is a not-for profit organization that
although autonomous, is accountable to the government.102 The
government of India is the “final authority” for “.in” domain
name in order to ensure its maintenance is in “accordance with
the public interest and relevant laws of the country.”103
III. Analysis
Although nations can censor what individuals within their
territory view on the internet,104 there are no definitive zones
ccTLD no longer are required to be Chinese entities).
101 China Internet Domain Name, supra note 98, art. 27.
102
.in Internet Domain Name, Policy Framework and
Implementation, Government of India, Ministry of Communications
& Information Technology, § 3.5.1 (2004) [hereinafter .in
policy].
103 Id. § 3.4.12.
104 See Oliveri supra note 54, at 6 (explaining how nations can
censor what their citizens view on the internet by either
controlling the internet service providers or establishing proxy
servers to block access to certain websites).
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of censorship in relation to the registration and adjudication
of domain names.105 But that could change in the very near
future.106 Neither ICANN, 107 nor individual nations that register
their own ccTLDs,108 explicitly protect an individual’s freedom
of speech in relation to a domain name. Thus, in order to
105 See Kleinwaechter supra note 24, at 1124 (arguing that ICANN
operates in an era where the concept of the nation state
is complemented by “an emerging new governance system”); see
also Froomkin, supra note 14, at 41 (maintaining that the domain
name system requires each domain name to be unique in order for
an individual to manage successfully manage a website, and not
necessarily because each domain name need an association with a
single “IP number”).
106 See Dauterman, supra note 5, at 1123 (hypothesizing that
national governments could instruct ccTLD managers to remove
unwanted second level domain from the Internet).
107 See White Paper supra note 20 (stating that the
organization in charge of domain names does not need to address
free speech “guarantees”).
108 See discussion, supra Part I.D (noting that the European
Union’s, China’s, and India’s laws did not explicitly mention
the importance of providing free speech protections in relation
to domain names).
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protect freedom of speech as it relates to domain names,
safeguards may have to be implemented through international
law.109
A. Domain Names Laws Affect an Individuals Free Speech
Domain name regulations clearly implicate free speech
interests for the global internet community. Domain names are
an important part of the internet because domain name
registrations increased dramatically around the world.110 The
109 See Kleinwaechter, supra note 24, at 1123-24 (recognizing
that conflicts are numerous between national governments and
private entities over the governance of the domain name system).
Such conflict arise from national policies that seek to restrict
freedom of speech in relation to domain names. Id. See also
Johnson & Post, supra note 36 ,at 1394 (arguing that
territorial local claims to restrict online transactions “should
be resisted”). The article goes on to state that resisting
territorial claims is the “net equivalent of the first
amendment”. Id., at 1395.
110 See Verisign Report, supra note 2, at 2 (providing statistics
that demonstrate that a "record setting" number of domain names
were registered in the third quarter of 2005).
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eighty five million domain names allow individuals to access a
website’s content and information. 111
But the current domain name system does not protect
individuals free speech rights. The UDRP allows for the
cancellation or transfer of a domain name.112 If a panel believes
that a gripe cite or even a similar domain name is acting in bad
faith,113 all the content on the domain name is lost, including
111 See Nunziato, supra note 10, at 193 (articulating that domain
names allow individuals to view the content on a website).
112 See UDRP, supra note 70, § 3 (stating that the UDRP panel
will “cancel” or “transfer” a domain name); see also Nunziato,
supra note 10, at 201-06 (contending that ICANN implicates an
individuals free speech rights because (1) a person cannot
anonymously register a domain name because ICANN requires
information, and (2) in the Cybersquating dispute resolution
framework).
113 See UDRP, supra note 70, § 4(b) (holding that evidence of bad
faith in the registration of domain names can lead to the
cancellation of that particular domain name); see also Badgley,
supra note 73, at 368 (arguing that when a gripe cite uses
“pejorative” language on the cite but not in the domain name the
free speech defense would only be available if the individual
did not receive any commercial gain form the use of the domain
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the critical commentary.114 Further, national governments can
regulate the types of domain names that register with the local
ccTLD, and like the UDRP, transfer or cancel the domain name.115
name, and the cite actually expresses ideas); Nunziato, supra
note 10, at 273 (explaining that in some cases the first
amendment does protect expressive phrases).
114 See Nunziato, supra note 10, at 193 (articulating that an
organization that controls the maintenance of a domain name,
can regulate the content of the website and ultimately the
internet by canceling the domain name); see also Cukier, supra
note 28, at IV (insisting that revoking a domain name on the
internet is similar to “political exile" because once the domain
name is revoked all the ideas and views on the website are lost
to the general public).
115 See discussion, supra Part II.D 1-3 (providing information
about national laws for the European Union, China, and India
domain names). The European Union places the question of
legitimate free speech concerns with national courts and
European Union laws. China does not allow any domain name that
goes against the national honor, and India stipulates that the
.in domain name will be maintained in "accordance with the
public interest". Id.
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B. The Increasing Role of National Governments Threatens
the Ability of Internet Users to Utilize Domain Names
to Advocate Free Speech.
Currently there is a vacuum of free speech protection as it
relates to domain names. Nations want an international body116
to control the allocation of domain names because of questions
over the legitimacy of a single private corporation in the U.S.
controlling the domain names system.117 But, at the same time
there is no guarantee in the UDHR that nations must protect free
116 See Guerrero Testimony, supra note 62 (detailing that because
ICANN is a private organization maintaining all the internet’s
domain names that ICANN legitimacy “remains in question”); see
also Cukier, supra note 4, at 7 (stating that many governments
feel that the internet should be regulated by a “multinational
treaty”).
117 See Froomkin, supra 92, at 842 (arguing that although many
governments participated in the development of ICANN, the
organization failed to reach consensus on a relatively small
range of topics). Compare Burt Helm, supra note 15 (explaining
how the ICANN vote was also seen within the international
community as another example of the United State’s control over
the internet), with Susan P. Crawford, The ICANN Experiment, 12
Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 409, 410 (2003) (insisting that
ICANN has undertaken policy decisions concerning the domain name
system "with very little oversight” from the U.S. government).
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speech as it relates to domain names.118 Further, the UDRP does
not officially recognize free speech as a legitimate interest in
a domain name.119 Thus, the increasing role of national
governments in the registration and adjudication of domain name
disputes could chill free speech rights for citizens around the
world if there is no protection.120
118 Compare UN Covenant, supra note 23, art. 19 § 2 (providing
no mention of domain names as a “frontier” guaranteeing the
right to freedom of expression), with UDHR, supra note 45, art.
19 (mentioning nothing about frontiers including domain names).
119 See Bridgestone, supra note 841 (indicating that the panel in
the Bridgestone case noted that free speech is not listed as a
legitimate noncommercial fair use); see also Sharrock, supra
note 68, at 831 (arguing that because the UDRP is not specific
the global internet community does not have a comprehensive
domain name regulation to address a variety of issues).
120See Kleinwaechter, supra note 24, at 1123 (stating that
national control of domain names could lead to a new level of
"censorship”); see also Cukier, supra note 28, at IV ("The
sequestration of ccTLDs by government authorities under claims
of national sovereignty opens up Internet users to very real
potential harms.”). “It certainly weakens ICANN's power to
influence how a (ccTLD) is politically run, which enabled the
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1. UNDP Regulations 4a and 4(c)iii do not Recognize
A Legitimate Free Speech Interest, and
Even When a panel May Recognize a Free Speech
Right, National Laws Play a Prominent Role in the
UDRP Decision
Free speech concerns were not an inherent part of the
development of ICANN121 nor the he UDRP.122 Section 4(c)(iii) of
the UDRP does not qualify any of the legitimate rights that an
individual may have in a domain name.123 The vague language in
section 4a may resolve the majority of domain name disputes that
involve some aspect of trademark infringement.124 But,
body to uphold the interests of a local Internet community and
not necessarily their government." Id.
121 See White Paper, supra note 20 (stating that the organization
in charge of maintaining the domain name system would not need
to address free speech protections because existing protections
would “not be disturbed”).
122 See UDRP supra note 70, § 4(c)(iii) (explaining that an
individual can demonstrate their rights by claiming a
legitimate non-commercial use, but the UDRP does not list what
are the legitimate non-commercial uses of a domain name).
123 Id.
124 See Nunziato, supra note 10, at 277 (detailing how the
developers of the UDRP intended that the policy would only
address disputes involving bad faith “cybersquatting”); see also
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individuals may argue that a domain name represents a free
speech interest, because the name directs internet users to the
website’s content.125 The Estee Lauder panel stated that the
respondents “extensive free speech right” provided by U.S. law
was not enough to overcome the UDRP’s vague standards.126 Thus,
the panel’s decision in Estee Lauder represents how even a claim
of a free speech interest in a domain name, can be completely
ignored due to the UDRP’s narrow focus on trademark issues.127
Bridgestone, supra note 81 (noting that the panel concluded that
its jurisdiction was limited to the policy and rules of the
UDRP); Mueller, supra note 74, at 22-7 (calculating that 2,500
unique organizations or individuals initiated complaints between
February 2000-February 2002).
125 See Bridgestone, supra note 81 (stating that under 4(c)(iii)
of the UDRP free speech is not listed as a legitimate
noncommercial interest); see also UDRP supra note 70, § 4(a)(ii)
(listing general applicable disputes which do not explicitly
include a free speech right).
126 Estee Lauder, supra note 77.
127 See Holstein-Childress, supra note 74 (arguing that the Estee
lauder panel's "expansive construction" of the UDRP foreclosed
any possibility of using a confusingly similar domain name to
draw attention to "the subject matter of a complaint site").
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Even when the Bridgestone panel did find a legitimate free
speech right to a domain name, it seemed to implicitly make its
decision128 based upon the substantial weight of U.S. case law.129
Courts in the United States have a clear history of protecting
and balancing free speech interests130, and thus U.S. case law
Compare Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir.
2003) (explaining that the Latham act, is constitutional because
it regulates “commercial speech” which is not entitled to strict
first amendment protections), with Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v.
Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the non-
commercial use of a domain name website does implicate the
“infringement” portion of the Lanham Act).
128 See Thornburg, supra note 14, at 210 (hypothesizing that UDRP
panels may feel compelled to consult specific national laws
because the UDRP’s vague laws do not address divergent national
laws).
129 Compare Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions Inc., 202 F.3d
573, 585 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that domain names are
neither entitled or excluded from the protections of the first
amendment), with Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)
(discussing how the Communications Decency act violated the 1st
amendment because the act completely silenced the ability of
internet users to engage in protected speech).
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may easily persuade any UDRP panel in recognizing a free speech
interest in relation to a domain name.131
But if all the individuals in a UDRP dispute are from a
nation, such as China132, that does not fully recognize freedom
of speech, UDRP panels might be inherently persuaded to not
recognize a legitimate free speech interest.133 Such a scenario
130 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (expressing
the idea that the state can limit free speech only if an
individual is advocating the incitement of “imminent lawless
action”).
131 But see Erica Schlesinger Wass, The United States' .US:
Striving for the American Dream, in Addressing the World
National Identity and Internet Country Code Domains, supra note
24, at 130 (reporting that NeuStar, Inc., the company in charge
of the .us domain name, developed a restrictive language policy
in order to “preserve” the value of the .us domain name).
132 See Chen, supra note 54, at 248 (explaining how China’s
attempt to implement its “golden shield project” depends largely
on the growth of software that enables nations to effectively
control the internet).
133 Compare Bridgestone, supra note 81 (noting that a WIPO
panel’s jurisdiction is limited to the rules of the UDRP), and
UDRP, supra note 70, § 4(a)(ii) (listing general applicable
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is not unlikely. Some of the accredited dispute resolution
organizations are located in different parts of the world,134 and
thus possibly persuaded by national laws that limit free
speech.135
2. The Influence of National Laws within the
Adjudication of Domain Name Disputes Through the
UDRP Also Threatens gTLDs
Although .com and .net are gTLDs such panel rulings could
further open the door for national laws to play a significant
role.136 The gTLDS are not in themselves subject to the
disputes which do not explicitly include a free speech right),
with Barcelona.com v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona,
330 F.3d 617, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that the
design of the UDRP gave full recourse to national laws in order
to prevent the “abuse of the UDRP process").
134 See Mota, supra note 69, at 217-18 (noting that the approved
providers of the UDRP include WIPO and the Asian Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Centre).
135 See id. (providing general information about the number of
cases each of the approved UDRP centers adjudicated in the past
year).
136 But see Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 623-24 (holding that
ICANN recognized in designing the UDRP that there should be full
recourse of panel decisions to national courts).
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jurisdiction of national governments.137 But because of the
vacuum left by the UDRP regulations in regard to freedom of
speech, any UDRP approved panel may consider national laws as
the only available source of legitimate law. 138
The UDHR, although considered customary international law,
might have very little weight, especially with parties from
nations where free speech interests are effectively silenced.139
Further nations can limit their obligations to the UDHR by
declaring they are within the general exceptions allowed by
Article 29.140 Even if a panel were to rule in favor of a free
137 See Thornburg, supra note 14, at 197 (arguing that gTLDS are
independent from national laws because they are subject to the
UDRP).
138 See Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy—Causes and Partial Cures, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 605, 642-44
(2002) (suggesting that the question of which national law
applies to a free speech issues is maybe beyond the UDRP since
it adjudicates only a “subset” of matters related to trademark
infringement).
139 See Chen, supra note 54, at 245 (listing nations that hamper
the ability of their citizens to access and view information on
the internet).
140 See UDHR Resolution, supra note 45, art. 29, § 2 (emphasizing
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speech interest, UNDRP allow parties to appeal to their national
courts.141 Corporations or parties could appeal their cases in
courts with national laws that do not fully recognize either the
UDHR or an individual’s free speech rights.142
3. ccTLD Laws Clearly Increase the Role of National
Governments
With national governments increasing their control over
ccTLDs, significant gaps may develop in freedom of expression
that individuals can limit the applicability of the UDHR in
order to meet the requirements of “morality, public order, and
the general welfare in a democratic society”); see also
Dauterman, supra note 5, at 210 (maintaining that an
individual’s rights to free expression under the UDHR can be
limited if the state chooses to exercise its police power in a
manner consistent with the provisions of the UDHR).
141 See UDRP, supra note 70, § 4(k) (stating that the mandatory
proceedings of the UDRP allow for an individual to submit any
domain name dispute to a “court of competent jurisdiction”). The
provision also suggests that an individual could bypass a UDRP
panel and file a complaint directly with a national court. Id.
142 See Froomkin, supra note 138, at 634 (articulating that
during the development of the UDRP, domain name holders argued
that they were unwilling to waive the right to have their day in
court because they believed they could win in a national court).
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and speech on the internet in relation to domain names. No
nation or entity can entirely control the internet and the
information that it provides to individuals around the globe.143
But ccTLD laws increase the role of national governments within
the domain name system.144
i. The Divergence of National Laws in Relation
to ccTLDs May Create Separate Free Speech
Zones on the Internet
Laws of the European Union, China, and India ultimately put
questions of free speech into the jurisdiction of laws enforced
by national governments.145 Both India and China explicitly state
143 See gilc, supra note 8 (explaining that the unique attributes
of the Internet, such as its openness and global reach, enable
the world wide web to circumvent the traditional forces of
government control).
144 See .eu regulation, supra note 94, art. 21 § 2(b)(i)-
(iii) (holding that a domain name holder is making a legitimate
noncommercial use of a domain name as long as the individual
does not intend to mislead consumers).
145 See China Internet Domain, supra note 98, art. 4 (noting
that the MII is responsible for the administration of domain
names in China); see also .in policy, supra note 102, §
3.4.12 (emphasizing that the government of India has “final
authority” of the .in domain name).
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that the government can deny a domain name that contains
contents that are contrary to the public interest.146 But on its
face, China’s domain name law appears more restrictive than the
laws currently governing the European Union’s and India’s
ccTLDs.147
With this divergence among national laws, separate free
speech zones on the internet could form.148 An individual
146 See .in policy, supra note 101, ¶ 3.4.12 (maintaining that
the government of India oversees the .in domain name in order to
ensure that the domain name system is maintained in accordance
with the “public interest”); see also China Internet Domain,
supra note 98, art. 27 (listing national security, and the
spread of pornography as reasons for canceling a domain name).
147 Compare China Internet Domain, supra note 98, art.
27 (detailing seven broad interests that the state has in
canceling a domain name), with .in policy, supra note 102, §
3.4.12 (noting that the government of India will regulate the
.in domain name in order to ensure that the “relevant laws of
the country” are maintained), and .eu regulation, supra note 94,
art. 21 § 2(c) (stating that a register to the “.eu” domain
name is subject to both national and European laws).
148 See Micael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. Rev 323, 335
(2003) (arguing that although the internet started as one
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registering a ccTLD in India or the European Union would have
substantially more free speech protection than in China.149 Such
a development would strengthen the current censorship of the
internet in certain areas of the world, and thus, further reduce
the power of the world-wide-web to transmit ideas across
national borders.150
unified network, the internet is becoming a “bordered medium”
because an individual’s location largely determines their
ability to access information).
149 Compare China Internet Domain, supra note 99, art.
27 (holding that China does not allow any domain names that
contains content which harms the national honor or
interest, violates state religion policies, and spreads
obscenity or instigates crime), with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964) (concluding that a public
official cannot recover from defamation unless they prove that
the statement was made with “actual malice”).
150 See Cukier, supra note 28, at IV (hypothesizing that as
national laws gain more control over the internet, the interests
of governments will overshadow those of the global internet
user).
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ii. National Laws that Limit Free Speech in
Relation to Domain Names Violate the Spirit
of the UDHR
Nations that place restrictions on the type of domain names
or ccTLD effectively curtail the free speech available in that
country.151 Although China may substantially control the flow of
information on the internet within its territory,152 China
explicitly states that any domain name cannot contain
information that offends the national honor or interest.153 Any
nation that restricts the free flow of information goes against
the spirit of Article 19 of the UDHR which states, “everyone has
the right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . regardless
of frontiers.”154
But China’s domain name laws likely do not offend its
obligations to uphold the UDHR.155 The UDHR broadly defines the
151 Cukier, supra note 4, at 7.
152 See Chen, supra note 534, at 248 (detailing China’s attempt
to
totally control the information its citizens can view on the
internet).
153 See China Internet Domain Name, supra note 98, art.
27 (listing seven areas of public welfare that information
located within a registered domain name cannot breach).
154 UDHR Resolution supra note 45, art. 29 § 2.
61
interests that entitle nations to limit the human rights of its
citizens,156 which can encourage high levels of censorship.157
Article 29 states that nations can limit the applicability of
article 19 in order to maintain morality, public order, and the
general welfare.158 Language such as general welfare is
especially vague, and China and India use similar language to
155 See Konkel, supra note 43, at 400 (noting that even
international treaties designed to protect an individual’s right
to express ideas allow governments to limit such expression in
order to preserve the overall “welfare” of the state).
156 See Dauterman, supra note 5, at 211-12 (arguing that the UDHR
allows states to curb freedom of expression “in the name of the
broad and vague terms” of protecting the welfare of their
citizens).
157 See White Paper supra note 20, ¶ 11 (articulating that the
United States wanted to give the management of the DNS to a
private organization in order to ensure that the concerns of the
global internet user would not be overshadowed by government
regulations).
158 See UDHR Resolution supra note 45, art. 29 § 2 (stating that
an individual’s rights can be limited by the necessity of
maintaining the public order).
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justify the invalidity of any domain name that may go against
the national interest.159
iii. China’s ccTLD Policy May Create a Conflict
Among Different Nations Laws that Protect
Freedom of Speech
China’s sweeping and general language also affects ccTLD
registration for domain name registers outside its territory.160
Although the European Union allows only the registration of
domain names too individuals within the community,161 China
allows entities outside of its territory to register ccTLDs.162 A
non-Chinese corporation163, who registers with the “.cn” ccTLD in
159 See discussion, supra Part II.D (specifying how both China
and India have substantial government oversight over the domain
name policies of their respective countries).
160 See Thornburg, supra note 14, at 197 (explaining how the .com
etc domain names are regulated by ICANN’s dispute policy).
161 See .eu regulation, supra 94, art. 4 § 2(b)(i)-(iii) (holding
that in order to register a domain name with the “.eu” ccTLD an
individual needs to be “a natural resident” of the European
Union).
162 See Hong, supra note 88, at 6 (reiterating that applicants
registering with the .cn ccTLD no longer are required to be
Chinese entities).
163 See id., at 7 (maintaining that individuals cannot register a
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China, could have its domain name transferred without
provocation.164
Although China could refuse to register a domain name
without reason,165 a corporation outside of China could still
have its free speech curtailed by national laws.166 Foreigners
may sue the local registry within China or seek redress with one
of the approved UDRP panels in order to protect their free
speech interests.167 Such a scenario could create a substantial
conflict between national laws protecting free speech and
China’s ccTLD regulations.168
.cn domain name).
164 See China Internet Domain Name, supra note 98, art. 27
(emphasizing that China does not allow any domain name that
violates the national honor or a state interest).
165 Id.
166 See .in policy supra note 102, § 3.4.12 (stating that the
government of India has “final authority” over the .in domain
name).
167 See UDRP, supra note 70, § 4(k) (explaining that an
individual can seek redress from the UDRP by bringing the matter
before a national court).
168 Compare Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492,
502 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that the first amendment protects
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C. International Organizations Are Not The Solution
Because an International Organization Would Not Be
Able to Affect Local ccTLD Laws and Reach Consensus on
Free Speech Protection.
Ceding control of the domain name system from ICANN to an
international organization would not solve the lack of free
speech protections related to domain names. Domain name
management involves the international community, with
organizations such as WIPO applying the UDRP to domain name
disputes.169 But some nations want ICANN to cede all authority to
an international organization, such as the United Nations.170
communications that go beyond the borders of the United States)
aff'd, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988), with European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 10 (holding that
everyone has the right to freedom of expression without the
interference of a “public authority" and regardless of
“frontiers”).
169 See Mota, supra note 69, at 217 (providing information and
statistics on WIPO’s domain name cases).
170 See Arch Puddington, Keep the Internet Free, The Washington
Post, Nov. 12, 2005, at A25 (confirming that a number of
countries are pressing to remove oversight from ICANN to a an
organization that would be part of the U.N.).
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Nations want ICANN to cede control over to an international
organization because of questions over the legitimacy171 of a
private organization in the United States controlling all of the
domain names world wide.172 Even if the United States decided to
cede control of the gTLD to an international body173, it is
171 See Guerrero testimony, supra note 62 (insisting that
national governments question ICANN’s “legitimacy” and
“effectiveness” because it is one private organization
controlling all the domain names world wide).
172 See Froomkin, supra note 92, at 853-54 (arguing that ICANN
cannot build consensus on the maintenance of the domain name
system principally because of the subject matter involved).
Froomkin believes that people involved in the ICANN process,
have conflicting economic and political goals. Id. See also
Chinese Domain Name Consortium, supra note 53, at 2 (proposing
the internationalization of the domain name system because of
the increasing number of internet users that do not speak
English).
173 But see Hearing Before Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation United States Senate, 107th Cong.(2002)
(testimony of Nancy J. Victory, Assistant Secretary for
Communication and Information National Telecommunications and
Information Administration United States Department of
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doubtful that such an organization could address the growing
influence of national ccTLD laws.174 Further the organization
would have the difficult task of formulating the extent of free
speech protection in relation to domain names.175 Although
international organizations are involved with deciding trade
mark disputes, building consensus on freedom of speech
Commerce) [hereinafter Victory Testimony] (testifying that the
United States believes private sector management is better than
having such functions performed by an inter-governmental body,
such as the International Telecommunication Union); see also
Froomkin, supra note 14, at 85 (arguing that government
involvement in DNS management would need to increase if ICANN
cannot implement the goals of the White Paper).
174 See Cukier, supra note 4, at 7 (articulating that national
governments view ccTLD as important part of their national
sovereignty).
175 See Froomkin, supra note 138, at 635-36 (explaining a similar
conflict that occurred with WIPO). Froomkin describes how WIPO
“consciously” excluded protection based on personal names etc.
because national laws “differed substantially as to the extent
names and other rights of personality” were protected. Id.
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protections has historically been a very difficult task in the
international realm.176
1. Although Nations May Not Have Substantial Control
Over gTLDs, Their Growing Influence Over ccTLDs
Threatens the Potential Power of a International
Organization
Currently nations want an international organization to
control the domain name system because one private organization
in the United States controls all domain names. Any organization
that controls the domain name system has a great deal of power
because of the importance of gTLDS in the domain name system.177
176 See Farley, supra note 35, at 1076 (providing a history of
the debate between the United States and the Soviet Union over
the MacBride Report on the New World Information and
Communication Order). Critics in the United States objected to
the report’s bias against the private sector’s involvement in
communications because of the first amendment’s protection of
the press to act as a private enterprise. Id., at 1077. See also
Krotoszynski Jr., supra note 8, 214 (explaining that cultural
considerations determine the amount of protection afforded to
speech).
177 See Froomkin, supra note 138, at 633 (emphasizing control of
TLD creates a “powerful leverage” because individuals that
register domain names want people from around the world to find
68
Private organizations maintain the gTLDs, and thus, national
governments cannot control gTLDs in the same way that local laws
regulate ccTLD.178 Overall, an important portion of the domain
name system is outside of the direct control of national
governments, and thus many governments may prefer an
international organization over the current governance
structure.179
their websites).
178 See Thornburg, supra note 14, at 14 (detailing how the gTLDs
are independent from national laws because all disputes
involving gTLDs are resolved by the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy which applies globally no matter where “in the world the
parties reside or do business.”); see also Geist, supra note
148, at 326 (arguing that many courts are reluctant to break up
the online world based upon the concept of personal
jurisdiction).
179 See Herbert Burkert, Symposium, ICANN Governance: About
a Different Kind of Water: An Attempt At Describing and
Understanding Some Elements of the European Union Approach to
ICANN 36 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 1185, 1192 (2003) (suggesting that
criticisms about the current approach to domain name governance
do not address the issue of whether an internationally
coordinated approach is necessary).
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But as more nations start to adopt local ccTLD laws, the
effectiveness of any organization, either public or private,
will weaken.180 The international community cannot assume that
because private organizations in the European Union, India, and
China run the local ccTLD registries that local government
influence might eventually weaken. The laws of the European
Union, China, and India ultimately put questions of free speech
in the hands of the national laws and not into the regulation or
discretion of private organizations.181 Even ICANN acknowledged
that the organization needed the input of the GAC in order to
180 See Cukier, supra note 28, at IV (arguing that internet users
face harm because national ccTLD laws take into account the
interests of the government and not the interests of the
individual); see also Froomkin, supra note 92, at 849 (noting
that a ccTLDs policies do not have to officially recognize the
UDRP process).
181 Compare China Internet Domain, supra note 98, art.
4 (holding that the government agency, MII, controls all domain
names in China), with .in policy, supra note 102, ¶ 3.4.12
(maintaining that the government of India has “final authority”
of the .in domain name), and .eu regulation, supra note 94 art.
21 §§ 2(b)(i)-(iii) (stating that a register to the “.eu” domain
name is subject to both national and European laws).
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effectively maintain the domain name system.182 Thus, the
opportunity to act may be closing because as ccTLD registrations
increase, nations and the global internet community may grow
comfortable with the divergence of free speech interest.183
2. An International Organization Would Loose
Credibility If It Determined The Extent of Free
Speech Protection in Relation to Domain Names
Nations have reached some common ground on what forms of
speech are not necessary to protect, such as the incitement of
discrimination against a particular group.184 But freedom of
expression is defined largely by the cultural values of
182 See M. Stuart Lynn, President Report: ICANN--The Case for
Reform, http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-
24feb02.htmLynn (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (insisting that a
formal relationship with ccTLDs is necessary in order to
preserve the "interoperability" of the DNS root file, and allow
local internet communities to handle "politicized" issues that
arise within individual nations).
183 See Cukier, supra note 28, at VII (“AT this stage in the
Internet’s development, many people are willing to sacrifice the
technology’s fast-paced development and radical innovation in
return for stability and predictability, which a more
governmental ICANN will mean.”).
184 See UDHR, supra note 45, art. 7 (noting that individuals
should be protected from incitement to discrimination).
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different societies across the globe and not by what a single
organization or nation believes.185 If an international
organization decided to determine the extent of free speech
associated with the transparent allocation of domain names,
national governments would likely raise the same legitimacy
concerns associated currently with ICANN.186
Many nations and local ccTLD organizations already view
ICANN as illegitimate.187 Such a view of ICANN could easily
transfer to an international organization if it decided to
regulate the content of expression within a nation.188 Thus,
185 See Weber, supra note 16, at 193 (explaining how the United
States has an open policy on free speech while other nations
do not).
186 Internet Management, supra note 62. See generally, Farley,
supra note 35, at 1074-78 (comparing the conflicts between the
east and west during the Cold War with UNESCO’s New World
Information and Communications Order, which looked to reform the
west’s news coverage of the third world and the Soviet Union).
187 See Froomkin, supra note 92, at 849 (emphasizing that many
ccTLD managers deny ICANN's authority to charge fees for the
number of second level domains registered).
188 See John-Perry Barlow, Accra Manifesto, http://lists.
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there is no reason to assume that any nation would comply with a
free speech protection that ran counter to their societal
beliefs.189
IV. Recommendations
The registration of Domain Names and the adjudication of
domain name disputes affect freedom of speech for the global
internet community.190 Although many of the domain name
registered are gTLD,191 the rise of ccTLDs registrations and the
increase power of national governments over those domain names
essential.org/pipermail/random-bits/2002-March/000792.html (last
visited Aug. 7, 2006) (suggesting that ICANN should become a
“loose confederation of autonomous domains” in order to ensure
that no central authority can regulate the character of domain
names).
189 But see Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1220 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a Court should not rush
to decide if a foreign nation violated the first amendment,
because the law is not clear on the extent to which the first
amendment applies outside of the United States).
190 See discussion, supra Part III.B (insisting that domain
names affect free speech because once a domain name is cancelled
all of the information is lost).
191 See Verisign Report, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that ccTLD
registrations grew by 25%).
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makes this point in history critical.192 Any recommendation needs
to address both gTLD maintained by ICANN and the ccTLD operated
by local managers and subject to national laws.193 By ignoring
the issues of domain name and freedom of speech, the windows in
which we view content over the internet could forever splinter
and divide.194 The world community cannot allow zones of free
speech in a bordered internet society.195
192 See Dauterman, supra note 5, at 1123 (arguing that
governments could instruct ccTLD managers to remove unwanted
ccTLD domain names from the internet without notice or a proper
adjudication procedure).
193 See discussion, supra Part III.B3 (detailing and explaining
how governments control ccTLDs through national and super-
national laws).
194 See Cukier, supra note 28, at IV (hypothesizing that if
governments are allowed to fully control ccTLD, then the
interests of the local Internet community may be lost).
195 Compare Interfax News Agency, supra note 9 (noting that
content makes the internet grow), with gilc, supra note 8
(explaining how the internet is a unique communications medium).
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A. National Governments Should Collaborate on a
Convention that Guarantees that Principles of Freedom
of Speech Will Be Safeguarded in Regard to ccTLDs.
The United States should motivate other national
governments to participate in an international convention that
seeks to establish a legal guarantee of freedom of speech in
relation to the registration and adjudication of ccTLD domain
names disputes. A convention is the appropriate forum to
determine free speech protections in relation to domain names,
because of the multiple cultural views of free speech and the
growing involvement of nations in the current domain name
system.196
The United States' leadership is necessary because America
developed the internet, and ceded partial control of the domain
name system to ICANN.197 Although the United States may hesitate
to participate in the convention,198 America should recognize
196 See discussion, supra Part III.C (discussing how freedom of
speech guarantees vary widely across the globe). If an
international organization attempted to control freedom of
speech, the organization would face criticisms that it is not
transparent or legitimate. Id.
197 See discussion, supra Part II.C (detailing how the
United States ceded partial control of the domain name system to
ICANN).
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that without an agreement, national influence over ccTLDs
increases every day.199 Other nations will likely join the
convention because of previous requests to openly discuss domain
name maintenance.200
1. A National Convention Needs to Affirm the
Importance of the Private Sector and Civil
Society in the Development of ccTLDs.
The WSIS summit reaffirmed the principle that the
maintenance of the internet should include the involvement of
government, the private sector, and civil society.”201 Nations
should reaffirm the same principle in regard to ccTLDs. Although
nations may consider ccTLDs as a part of their national
sovereignty, outside factors and individuals can influence ccTLD
laws.202 By affirming the role of the private sector and civil
198 See Victory Testimony, supra note 173 (testifying that the
United States believes private sector management is better than
having such functions performed by an inter-governmental body)
199 See Verisign Report, supra note 2, at 3 (noting the record
growth of ccTLDs in 2005).
200 See articles, supra note 15 (explaining how national
governments want an international organization to control the
domain name system because of the perceived control of the
United States over ICANN).
201 Tunis Agenda, supra note 4, ¶ 29.
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society in the maintenance of ccTLDs, nations should want to
develop local laws that embrace concerns of individual internet
users, which include the ability to access information on the
internet.203
2. A National Convention Should Incorporate the UDHR
into ccTLD laws.
Nations should affirm the principles of article 19 of the
UDHR into their ccTLDs law. Attempting to regulate national
ccTLD laws will be difficult because many nations consider
ccTLDs as a part of their national sovereignty.204 Nations could
202 See Yu, supra note 12, at 388-90 (articulating that although
nations were initially uninterested in ccTLDs, as the internet
developed national governments realized the social and economic
importance of domain name system); see also Fred Hao, Chinese
Domain Name Dispute Resolution, China Law & Practice, April 1,
2004, at 23 (insisting that domain name registrations are
important for the Chinese government because of the utility of
domain names in helping the economy grow).
203 See Nunziato supra note 10 ,at 250 (arguing that in order to
protect freedom of speech a government or organization must
recognize the interests of groups and provide adequate
safeguards to ensure compliance).
204 Yu, supra note 26, at 388-90 (emphasizing how ccTLD operators
want a greater degree of autonomy from ICANN).
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easily ignore any international convention that attempts to
control their own views of what freedom of speech protections
should include.205 Recognized as customary international law,
the UDHR is not binding on nations,206 and thus, the application
of the UDHR is unlikely to arouse national sovereignty
concerns.207 By incorporating article 19 of the UDHR, nations
will affirm a protection of freedom of speech in relation to
ccTLDs that currently does not exist.208 At the very least,
national laws will acknowledge the connection between a ccTLD
and individuals free speech interest.
205 See UDHR Resolution, supra note 4547, art. 29 § 2 (stating
that nations can limit protections found in the UDRP in order to
ensure the “general welfare in a democratic society”).
206 Id.
207 See Konkel, supra note 43, at 472 (noting that the UDHR has
become a “normative instrument” for member states).
208 See UDHR Resolution, supra note 455, art. 19 (stating that
nations should not limit freedom of expression regardless of
frontiers, but no where in the article 19 is frontiers
qualified).
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3.  In the Alternative to adopting the UDHR, A
National Convention Needs To Define Positive
Rights of Free Speech in Relation to Domain
Names.
In the past, national governments reached consensus on what
forms of speech should not be protected. But as of yet there
exist no affirmative freedom of speech right in relation to
ccTLDs on the internet.209 Because the level of free speech
protections across the globe varies,210 the United States cannot
push for a level of protection that is equal to those enshrined
into the Constitution.211
209 Id.
210 See Sakura Mizuno, When Free Speech and the Internet Collide:
Nazi-Paraphernalia Case, 10 Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 56, 64-65
(2002) (describing how even France and the United States, two
signatories to the UDHR and historically strong advocates of
individual freedoms, differ on the extent of free speech
protections.)
211 Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)
(expressing the idea that the state can limit free speech only
if an individual is inciting “imminent lawless action”), with
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)(holding that since the
the Communications Decency act prohibited a form of protected
speech it violated the first amendment).
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The national convention should guarantee at least two
positive freedom of speech rights in regards to ccTLDs:
criticism of corporation and government abuses, and detailing
organizations that solicit hate speech. Nations already
acknowledge the importance of these free speech rights.212
Nations that do not provide strong protections for speech will
likely not sign this portion of the convention. But if enough
countries sign onto the convention, then the possible zone of
free speech in regard to ccTLDs laws will be neither as severe
or numerous.
B. ICANN Needs to Acknowledge in the UDRP That
Domain Name Disputes Could Implicate Article 19
of the UDHR
Although the UDRP was meant to adjudicate a very narrow set
of claims the UDRP needs to explicitly recognize the UDHR.213 By
recognizing the UDHR ICANN would not attempt to recognize one
212 See Morsink, supra note 23, at 72 (detailing how UDHR
article seven states that an individual should be free of
discrimination, and that nations wanted this article to also
protect against the incitement of discriminatory speech).
213 This is somewhat different than the recommendation made by
Nuzniato. See Nunziato, supra note 10, at 250 (“ICANN’s
foundational documents should be amended to embody an explicit
commitment to protecting the substantive democratic norm of
freedom of expression.”).
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specific free speech interest,214 Thus, ICANN’s recognition of
the UDHR is unlikely to upset governments that already believe
the organization ignores national concerns in regards to freedom
of speech.215
Section 4a of the UDRP needs to add subsection (iv) with
the following language: The UDRP acknowledges that Respondent
may have a freedom of speech interest in maintaining the domain
name. Although this argument is likely outside of the procedures
of the UDRP, these procedures recognize that the UDHR article 19
creates a legitimate interest for domain name users. Although
individuals could still appeal UDRP decisions to national
courts216 by adding the following language to the UDRP,
214 See discussion, supra Part III.C (arguing that if an
international organization attempted to define free speech it
would suffer from the same transparency and illegitimacy
concerns as ICANN)
215 See Thornburg, supra note 14, at 211 (stating that private
rule making should only be done in areas of the law where the
international community has a high level of unanimity).
216 See Barcelona.com v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona,
330 F.3d 617, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that ICANN
designed the UDRP to give full recourse to national laws in
order to prevent the corruption of the UDRP process); see also
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accredited panels should not completely ignore free speech
interests,217 or base free speech rights entirely on national
laws.218
C. UDHR Article(s) 19 & 25(2) Need To Be Amended to
Include More Specific Language about the Guarantee of
Freedom of Speech in Relation to Domain Names.
Ultimately the international community needs to amend the
UDHR in order to account for the development of the internet.219
The term frontiers in Article 19 of the UDHR should be qualified
by imputing the following language: Frontiers include the
communications mediums such as television, radio, and the
Sharrock supra note 68, at 83 (arguing that the current UDRP
framework did not fulfill the need of the international
community to have a consistent adjudication process).
217 See Estee Lauder, supra note 807 (holding that the
respondent’s first amendment interests did not outweigh the
trademark interest articulated in the UDRP)
218 See Bridgestone, supra note 81 (noting that U.S case law
influenced the WIPO panel’s decision).
219 See Morsink, supra note 23, at 66 (explaining that the
destructive discriminatory speech of Nazis and other fascist
groups before and during World War motivated the language
contained in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights).
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internet and their devices to aid in the communication of
content, such as domain names. Qualifying the term frontiers
will place an international guarantee of free speech in regards
to domain names, which currently does not exist.220
Article 29(2) of the UDHR states that in the exercise of
these rights can be limited in order to meet the “requirements
of morality, public order, and the general welfare in a
democratic society”221 The current broad language allows nations
to completely ignore article 19.222 The word reasonable should be
inserted just before the world requirements. The word reasonable
will, at the very least, limit the broad and vague discretion
that nations currently enjoy through article 29.223
220 See UDHR Resolution, supra note 45, art. 19 (stating that
article 19 does not qualify the term frontiers).
221 Id.,art. 29 sec. 2.
222 See Konkel, supra note 43, at 465 (insisting that the UDRP
only requires nations to protect a “low level” of speech and
expression).
223 See UDHR Resolution, supra note 47, art. 29 § 2 (holding
that rights within the UDRP can be limited in order to
meet the “requirements of morality, public order, and the
general welfare in a democratic society”).
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V. Conclusion
The conflict between a private organization running the
domain name system and the sovereign rights of states to
regulate the internet brings to the forefront a key legal issue:
the extent to which governments should control freedom of speech
within the existing domain name system.224 The vacuous response
to freedom of speech concerns in both the development of ICANN
and the current language of the UDHR allowed for the increased
influence of national governments in the domain name system.225
With national governments increasing their control over ccTLDs,
significant gaps may develop in freedom of expression and speech
on the internet in relation to domain names.226 Thus, in order to
protect freedom of speech as it relates to domain names, an
international convention of nations, ICANN, and the UDHR should
224 See discussion, supra Part II. (explaining the current
tension between national governments and the private
organization that currently manages the domain name system).
225 See discussion, supra Part III. (arguing that the lack of
recognition of free speech in relation to domain names by both
ICANN and the UDHR allowed for the increased influence of
national governments).
226 See discussion, supra Part III.B3 (emphasizing that different
national laws in relation to domain names could create zones of
free speech on the internet).
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acknowledge freedom of speech in relation to domain names227
227See discussion, supra Part IV. (reccomending that a national
convention should acknowledge free speech in relation to domain
names). Further ICANN needs to amend the UDRP to recognize free
speech as a legitimate commercial interest, and both UDHR
article 19 and 29 should be amended to ensure that freedom of
speech guarantees are applied to the domain name system. Id.
